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EFFECT OF CORPORATE TRANSFORMATION UPON
ADEMPTION, LAPSE, AND FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENTS
ALVIN

E. EVANS

The merger, consolidation and other transformations of corporations give rise to three closely related problems. One of them involves
the ademption of legacies of stock in a corporation which, before the
testator's death, has passed through some form of change. In the case
of legacies, it is commonly said that if the thing (tangible or intangible)
does not continue to exist, the legacy is adeemed. Another arises in
those cases where the beneficiary of a legacy is a corporation and the
question is whether its successor is entitled to the gift. A third problem
exists where a corporation is appointed executor or trustee or both and
after an alteration in its structure takes place, the new corporation claims
the privilege of succeeding to the appointment. The same general principles may be applicable to all three situations.
The more important changes of corporate structure raising the
issue of ademption of legacies are: (I) recapitalization involving splitups and reductions, and change from common to preferred and the
reverse; the conversion of securities into another form involving substitutes of a different quality and the bringing of surplus into capital
by the declaration of stock dividends, (2) merger, (3) consolidation,
(4) reorganization, (5) sale of assets.
I.

ADEMPTION OF STOCK LEGACIES BY ALTERATION OF THE
CORPORATION

The earlier view respecting ademption attempted to give effect to
the intent of the testator." Later, under the influence of Lord Thurlow,
the test of ademption came to be "does the thing bequeathed continue to
exist as a part of the estate?" 2 We have never, however, gotten wholly
away from the conviction that the intention of the testator should be
considered, and courts are now more frequently following that which
they believe is the intent rather than simply the difficult test of unt Dean and Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; author of
The Survival of Powers of Joint Executors to Sell Land (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV.
154; and of other articles in legal periodicals.
I. (1935) iO Wis. L. REv. 307, 3o8. For an excellent discussion, see Mechem,
Specific Legacies of Unspecific Things-Ashburner v. MacGuire Reconsidered (1939)
87 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 546. See also Notes (1929) 63 A. L. R. 639; (1935) 97 A. L. R.
1033; (1938) 117 A. L. R. 811. See also I" re Slater [19o7] i Ch. 665, 8 AN. CAS.
141 (igoS) ; Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. IOI.
2. Ashburner v. MacGuire, 2 Bro. C. C. io8, 29 Eng. Rep. R. 62 (1786).
(67i)
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changed existence. In fact, it appears that the law of wills respecting
ademption frequently finds itself in conflict with corporate theory expressed in many decisions, that the economic equivalent of the stock
given goes to the legatee. Thus, it may be suggested that the older rule
of property law which is stricter and inelastic, conflicts with the later
rule of corporation law due to the rapid changes which are being made
in investment practices, and which invite a different legal result.
(i)

Recapitalization

(a) Split-ups and Reductions: In all cases where the legacies have
been held to be specific, the additional number of shares after the split-up
occurred also passed to the legatee.3 If there is a reduction in the
number of shares arising from an increase in the par value, additional
purchases, even though they make the total number of shares held in
the estate equal to the number given in the will, do not pass under the
legacy.4 The principle of economic equivalent is fully recognized. If,
on the other hand, the legacy is general, then the increased number after
a split-up does not pass to the legatee. 5
In the case of split-ups or reductions, there are usually few circumstances affecting the result other than the question whether the
gift is specific or general. In In re Gillins,6 particularly, a case of a
general legacy, it is noted that the result that the increased number does
not pass cannot be the one intended by the testator. He had, by will,
apparently disposed of all his property, including his stocks. To hold
that the increase does not pass to the legatees is to leave him intestate
in some portion of his stocks. If one must insist upon the "my" test 7
3. Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, ioi Conn. 359, 125 At. 871 (1924) (5
shares for I split-up) ; Birley's Administrators v. United Lutheran Church in America,
239 Ky. 82, 39 S. W. (2d) 203 (1931) (par reduced and 4 shares for i split-up) ; First
National Bank v. Union Hospital, 281 Mass. 64, 183 N. E. 247 (932)
( 2 / shares for
i split-up) ; In re Mandelle's Estate, 252 Mich. 375, 233 N. W. 230 (1930) (split-up
accompanied by refraining of corporate structure and par changed to no par) ; In re
Martin's Will, 252 N. Y. 582, 17o N. E. 151 (1929) (4 shares for i split-up); Walton
v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258 (N. Y. 1823) (3 shares for i split-up of stock in navigation company. Stock became vested in the state by act of the legislature and the sum
paid for it goes to the legatee) ; Re Greenberry, 55 SoL. J. 633 (Ch. igi) (io shares
for i split-up). But see Wood's Estate, 267 Pa. 462, iO Atl. 9o (1920).
4. Fidelity Ins. Trust and Safe Deposit Co.'s Appeal, IoS Pa. 492, I At. 233
(1885). There, par was doubled and the number of shares reduced by one-half. The
shareholders were given the right to buy additional shares which the testator did and so
had the exact number named in the will.
5. Heckler v. Young, 264 Ill. App. 34 (I93I) (here the increased number passed,
though the legacy was general because of the intent shown by other language) ; In re
Gillins [I909] i Ch. 345 (5 shares for i split-up. The court points out that such gifts
are generic, subject to increase and diminution).
6. [19o9] i Ch. 345. See also Re Gray [1887] 36 Ch. 205, where there was 2
shares for i split-up, and an unlimited company (partnership) was changed to a limited company along with a change of par from IOO to 60. The legacy was general and
the legatee took all.
7. This test, not used here, provides that the use of the words "my stock" in the
will indicate that ademption is to be determined as of the time the instrument was
executed.
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as the distinction between specific and general, he may still urge that
the will should be interpreted as of its own date." Other circumstances occasionally appearing along with split-ups, such as stock dividends, change in capital structure, change of name, property taken
over by the state, are discussed later.
(b) Interchange of Parand Non-Par, of Preferredand Common:
Is the change of par stock to non-par or of non-par to par, or of preferred to common, or of common to preferred a change of substance?
The authorities on this matter, taken alone, are very meager. There are
usually other factors involved which are likely to be of themselves controlling. In In re Mandelle's Estate,9 however, the only other factor
was a split-up. This fact, as has been seen, is without significance. Par
was exchanged for no-par and the court held there was no ademption
because there was no intent to adeem. Notice was taken of the fact
that the change was not initiated by the testatrix, and the test of
economic equivalence was not specifically applied. In a similar way in
Will of Hinners,10 the common stock, subject of the legacy, was replaced
partly with common and partly with preferred. Not only was the capital structure altered, but there was a complete reorganization. There
was no ademption, said the court, because there was no intent to adeem.
The book value had more than doubled after the will was executed
at or before the time of the reorganization. Probably a change from
par to non-par or from non-par to par may be regarded as formal.
There is little difference to the investor, economically, whether his stock
is par or non-par.
It scarcely seems possible, however, to say that the change from
common to preferred is merely formal. The alteration in the right to
preference for dividends and in the assets on winding up appears to
be a substantial change. The justification for the result must depend
upon either the intent of the testator, or upon the proposition that he
had received an approximate economic equivalent for his old stock.
(c) Stock Dividends: Specific legacies of stock draw to themselves such stock and cash dividends as are declared after the testator's
death.:" With respect to stock dividends declared before the death of
8. This is precisely the ground for no ademption in Uhrig v. Johns Hopkins University, 145 Md. 114, 125 Atl. 6o6 (1924).
9. 252 Mich. 375, 233 N. W. 23o (1930).
I0. 216 Wis. 294, 257 N. W. 148 (1934).

See also It re Leeming [1912] i Ch.

828, io6 L. T. R. (N. s.) 793 (reorganization and same name retained, ordinary shares
were replaced by ordinary and preference shares).
ir. McLaran v. Crescent Planing Mill Co., 117 Mo. App. 40, 93 S. W. 819 (i9o6)

(dividend shares declared after death) ; Maclaren v. Stainton, 3 DeG. F. & J. 202, 45
Eng. Rep. R. 855 (Ch. App. 1861). Cash dividends paid or declared before death do
not go to the specific legatee. Matter of Kernochan, lO4 N. Y. 618, ii N. E. 149
(1887) (cash dividend paid to testator) ; Brundage v. Brundage, 6o N. Y. 544 (1875)
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the testator, the courts do not agree upon how they shall pass. In one
English case, 12 where the legacy was specific there was an increase
called a bonus issue, but it may have been like a split-up of shares
rather than a capitalization of surplus. The increase, however, did
not pass as part of the legacy, the argument being that only so many
shares as are mentioned can pass. But this does not agree with the
theory or result in the split-up cases. It is flatly declared in Rhode
3
Island, also, that stock dividends do not pass to the specific legatee,'
and the same result was reached in New York in Matter of Braim. 4
Here thirty shares of the Standard Oil stock were specifically bequeathed. The company had been required by court order to de-consolidate and therefore it had declared stock dividends in its subsidiaries.
After the distribution of subsidiary stock to shareholders the testatrix
executed a codicil but took no notice of the stock dividend. She did,
however, make several small pecuniary legacies which must fail if the
stock dividends pass with the specific legacy. The shares were still not
far below their former market value, whereas if the dividends pass
the former value would be greatly enhanced. The result probably
agrees with the presumed intention of the testatrix, and gives to the
legatee the economic equivalent of the legacy at the time the will was
executed.
Three courts of last resort have held that the stock dividend
passes with the specific legacy. Thus, in Chase NationalBank v. Deichmiller,15 not only the additional shares arising from a split-up but the
additional shares arising from capitalizing surplus went to the legatee.
Intent was declared to be a material factor with reference to the question of ademption, and it was felt that the testator meant to give the
(interest certificates delivered to the testator). For general legacy and cash dividend,
see Cogswell v. Cogswell, 2 Edw. Ch. 231 (N. Y. 1834) ; De Gendre v. Kent, L. R. 4
Eq. 283, 16 L. T. R. (N. s.) 694 (1867). In Ogden v. Pattee, 149 Mass. 82, 21 N. E.
227 (1889) it was held that a dividend coupon overdue at the testator's death, but siill
attached, passed to the specific legatee.
12. Norris v. Harrison, 2 Madd. 268, 56 Eng. Rep. R. 333 (V. C. 1817).
13. Sherman v. Riley, 43 R. I. 202, iO Atl. 629 (192o) ; accord, Union Trust Co.

v. Taintor, 85 Conn. 452, 83 At. 697 (1912) ; Hicks v. Kerr, 132 Md. 693, 104 AtI. 426
(i921) ; McGregory v. Gaskill, 296 S. W. 833 (Mo. App. 1927). See also Notes (1921)
To A. L. R. 1326; (1934) 89 A. L. R. 1130.
14. 219 N. Y. 263, 114 N. E. 404 (1i16).
See also Brundage v. Brundage, 60
N. Y. 544 (875), which cannot properly be classed with this case since the dividend
was not stock but interest certificates and so more similar to a cash dividend. This
case has the effect of overruling Matter of Leavitt's Estate, 86 Misc. 6og, 148 N. Y.
Supp. 758 (Surr. Ct. I914), where it was held that dividends declared in subsidiary
corporations did pass, otherwise there would be a great decrease in the value of the
specific legacy.
15. 1O7 N. J. Eq. 379, 152 At. 697 (193o). In Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S. W. 91 (1927) the court observed that a stock dividend was
not a dividend at all in any true sense. "A dividend", it said, implies a division and
severance from the corporation's assets of the subject of the dividend and a distribution
thereof among the shareholders. But a stock dividend is a mere incident of bookkeeping. Thus, equity comes in to modify the doctrine of ademption. See (1926) IT CORN.
L. Q. 271; (1926) 14 Ky. L. J. 182.
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shares as they had been, which included in their value their proportionate
part of the surplus. So, in Will of Hinners,'" where there was a reorganization and an alteration of the capital structure, the stock dividend
was declared to be a part of the reorganization plan and for that reason
passed with the stock in the reorganized company. The book value had
doubled after the will was executed, due to the accumulation of surplus.
The stock dividend was obviously a part of the stock and created a
mere formal change as to a stockholder. Although the court observes
that generally the specific legatee does not get the stock dividend, the
facts of the case are not such as should make it peculiar. Likewise, in
Kentucky 1 7 it has been held that where there was a merger of T bank
into P bank and the testator received five shares of stock in the P bank
in place of his five shares of T stock, and in addition he received a
liquidating dividend of stock in a real estate corporation (coincidentally
formed to take over the T bank's land holdings) this dividend also
passed to the specific legatee. The court's opinion warrants the conclusion that stock dividends should pass to the legatee because they are
part of the principal stock given him.
In the analogous case of the successive interests of life tenant and
remainderman, the rule adopted by the American Law Institute takes
into consideration the period of time during which the surplus has
accrued. If the accrual occurs between the time the trust was established and the death of the life tenant, then it goes as income to the
life tenant. This rule is regarded as expressive of the intent of the
settlor.' 8 In the same way it seems fair to suppose that the testator
means to give all the economic interest in the corporation represented
by the specific shares bequeathed. If in the case of split-ups, which
primarily affect the capital stock, the legatee gets the new number as
well, be should also have the extraordinary stock dividend which represents the interest which, prior to the declaration, attached to the surplus.
Change of Name
The case of mere change of name, not associated with a consolidation or reorganization or change from a state into a national corporation, is not frequent. It is likely to occur in connection with some
(2)

16. 216 Wis. 294, 257 N. W. 148 (1934), and see In re Adams' Estate, go Misc.
254, 152 N. Y. Supp. 727 (Surr. Ct. 1915), where the testatrix, after having specially
bequeathed her 166 shares of mining stock, later received 472 additional shares as stock
dividends. These were held to pass to the specific legatee. Under much the same facts,
a contrary result was reached in a recent English case. In re Kuypers [1925] Ch. 244,
133 L. T. R. (N. s.) 468. Here the stock dividend was issued in compensation for
reduction in rights. To have given double the number of shares named in the will
would have resulted in a slightly increased call on dividends (16% rather than 1)
but would have had no effect on the proportionate interest in corporate capital.
17. Goode v. Reynolds, 208 Ky. 441, 271 S. W. 6oo (1925).
I8. See RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935)

§ 236.
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alteration in the corporate structure, 19 and is mere formality, having no

effect upon the legacy.
(3) Liquidation Without Reorganization
Presumably the liquidation of a corporation does not adeem the
legacies of stock in it save as the value of the assets is lessened, but
20
there is not much authority on this point.
(4) Alteration of Status from State to National Bank
This problem is more commonly raised in those cases where a
bank has been named executor-trustee and alters its status thereafter.
Thus, a state bank may become a national bank subject to the federal
statutes and supervision. A consideration of this matter is for the
present reserved. There is clearly here no change of substance econom21
ically which should cause an ademption.
(5) Conversion and Substitution
The securities may contain a provision for conversion such as
bonds for stock or stock for bonds, and the testator may convert by an
agreement, subsequently made, or the conversion may be made involuntarily so far as he is concerned.
If the proposed conversion of stock into bonds is not completed
at the death of the testator, the subsequent conversion naturally does
not cause an ademption, even though the testator has made a voluntary
arrangement for the conversion. If there was any intent to adeem, it
was not expressed in a way as to be effective. 22
19. Uhrig v. Johns Hopkins University, 145 Md. 114,

change of name so far as appears) ; ln re Clifford

[1912] I

14 (similar) ; Guardian Trust & Exrs. Co. v. Smith (1923)

Thus in Maryland,
At. 6o6 (1924) (mere
lo6 L. T. R. (N. s.)
N. Z. L. R. 1284 (change

125

Ch.

29,

of name and alteration of the memorandum of association). See discussion of reorganization, p. 68o infra.
2o. See Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258 (N. Y. 1823) (charter had expired
and assets were transferred to trustees for the shareholders). Cf. In re Howard's
Estate, 46 Misc. 204, 94 N. Y. Supp. 86 (Surr. Ct. 1905). Here there was a legacy of
"all my deposit of money in B bank". The bank was liquidated and one dividend had
been placed to the credit of testator of which he had used a part. It was held that the
legatee gets the balance in preference to the residuary legatee. In Guardian Trust &
Exrs. Co. v. Smith (1923) N. Z. L. R. 1284, the corporation was first consolidated with
another. The new corporation failed and was liquidated. Its assets were sold to a
trustee for a new corporation and the liquidators received one-half the stock in the new
corporation. The court held that the legacies were adeemed. This is not, however, a
clear case on liquidation.
21. Maynard v. Mechanics National Bank, i Brewst. 483 (Pa. C. P. 1867) (legacy
of stock of a state bank which became a national bank) ; cf. Michigan Ins. Co. v. Eldred,
143 U. S. 293 (1892) (change of a state into a national bank with change of name
does not affect its identity nor right to sue on claims due it under its former name) ;
Poisson v. Williams, 15 F. (2d) 582 (E. D. N. C. 1926) (trustee transformed from a
state to a national bank) ; Adams v. Atlantic Nat. Bank, 115 Fla. 399, 155 So. 648
(1934) (state bank named executor merged with national bank) ; Alt v. Liberty Nat.
Bank, 26o Ky. 87, 83 S. W. (2d) 866 (1935) (state bank named executor became a
national bank).
22. In re Frahm's Estate, 120 Iowa 85, 94 N. W. 444 (1903).
See, Effect on Beqwst of Stock of Substitution or Change of Stock by the Company (1929) 63 A. L.
R. 639.
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it is held that where the substitution of bonds, not convertible by their
terms, for stock did not originate with the testator, there is no ademption. 23 It is clearly implied, therefore, that ademption is a matter
rather of intent than of change of form or substance. If the change
were initiated by the testator there is room for the inference that an
ademption was intended. But such an inference seems far fetched.
The intent to make a substantial alteration in one's holdings need not
be an intent to adeem. Here again the economic substitute may be
found in the existing thing. In it re Pilkington.'s Trust,2 4 stocks
were replaced by bonds, the transaction being a general one initiated
by the corporation. The testator assented and later republished his
will, but made no mention of the matter. Jarman thinks that the
republication is without significance in this respect, 25 knowledge by the
testator of the new quality being held to be unimportant. It was not his
voluntary act, since the will made a gift of the bonds "according to the
nature and quality thereof". These words indicate a lack of intent
to adeem.
In In re Lane 26 the conversion of debentures into debenture stocks
was made at the maturity of the bonds and not in pursuance of any
conversion privilege incident to the execution of the bonds. Being a
voluntary change of substance, this was regarded as indicating an
intention to adeem. Here also is the implication that there would have
been no ademption if the bonds had contained a recital of the conversion privilege. In such a case, the legacy contains within itself its
quality of alterability. However, it is important to note the case of
First National Bank v. Perkins Institute,27 where the legacy consisted
of callable stock which was called, and in substitution therefor the
underwriters offered debentures, the funds so derived to be used to
purchase the stock. It was held that since the debentures came from
the bankers and not from the company, there was a change of sub23. Uhrig v. Johns Hopkins University, 145 Md. 114, 125 At. 6o6 (1924) (there
was also a reorganization, and bonds in the new corporation were substituted). See
also Spinney v. Eaton, III Me. I, 87 Atl. 378 (1913) (stocks exchanged for bonds of
same company, the change being initiated by the company). In Kenaday v. Sinnott, 179
U. S. 6o6 (I9OO), a deposit of $ioooo in a bank was specifically bequeathed. The
testator drew out $9,ooo and invested it in bonds. The court inferred from the fact that
this was part of the provision for his wife and also because he would otherwise have
died partially intestate, that there was no ademption.
24. 13 L. T. R. (N. s.) 35 (V. C. 1865). See also Bronsdon v. Winter, I Amb.
57, 27 Eng. Rep. R. 32 (Ch. 1738). In Re Lane, 14 Ch. D. 856 (1888) the exercise
of an option to exchange debentures for debenture stocks was held an ademption.
25. I JARIMAX, WILLS (7th ed. 193o) x89, n. 8.
See also Hosea v. Jacobs, 98
Mass. 65 (1867) note 51 infra, noted there on the matter of republication.
26. 14 Ch. D. 856 (1888).
27. 275 Mass. 498, 176 N. E. 532 (1931).
See also Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35
(N. Y. 1850) (bond secured by mortgage, mortgage foreclosed and land resold and
new bond and mortgage received from a different purchaser); Blackstone v. Blackstone, 3 Watt. 335 (Pa. 1834) (bequeathed stock sold and purchaser's bond for payment received).
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stance involving a change of obligor and so an ademption. Although
the economic aspect was not considered, it seems that a change of
obligor does not necessarily work an ademption where a substantially
economic equivalent is found. Thus, where the legacy consisted of a
note signed by A and B and the testator accepted a new note in place
of it signed by B and C, there was, in the opinion of the court, no
ademption.

28

Here we may also consider those cases where the state is successor
to private corporations and the obligations of the latter are transformed
into those of the former. In an early New York case 29 the obligation
of the state substituted for stock of a private corporation caused no
ademption. In the later English case of In re Slater,3 0 however, the
court held there was an ademption. There the testator bequeathed the
interest from money invested in the stocks of a certain private water
company. By statute and under eminent domain proceedings the shareholders received semi-municipal stocks instead of cash when the municipality took over the plant. The court laid some emphasis upon the fact
that these new shares were interests in a unified project resulting from
the union of a number of water works projects located throughout London, while the bequeathed shares represented interests only in a constituent corporation-a change of economic substance. Apparently,
then, the New York court applied the economic test and the English
court applied the test of substantial change though the facts are similar.
Where the substance or identity is maintained, though the alteration affects a term of the description, there is naturally no ademption.
Thus, a legacy of the whiskey business located at X is somewhat analogous to a gift of shares of stock. A change of location is not a change
of substance. 31 So a general legacy of annuities described in such way
as to be referable only to those in existence at the date of the will, is not
28. Pope v. Hinckley, 209 Mass. 323, 95 N. E. 798 (1911) (a voting trust certificate obligation of the reorganization committee substituted for stock) ; Prendergast v.
Walsh, 58 N. J. Eq. 149, 42 Atl. 1O49 (1899) (deposits in four banks withdrawn and
redeposited in other banks) ; Stout v. Hart, 7 N. J. L. 414 (18O1) ; Doughty v. Stillvell, i Bradf. 3oo (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 185o) (note of a church secured by mortgage bequeathed. On transfer of church to another church, a new note and mortgage were
substituted) ; Ski1iwith v. Cabell, 1g Gratt. 758 (Va. 1870) (private bonds guaranteed
by the state surrendered and state bonds substituted). Cf. Tipton v. Tipton, 41 Tenn.
252 (I86O), where a note was sold and the note of the purchaser was accepted, it was
held there was an ademption. Compare Holmes v. Langley [1913] 1 Ir. R. 232 (power
of appointment adeemed by change of obligor), with Browne v. M'Gire, i Beatty Ch.
R. 358 (Ir. 1829) (where there was an ademption in a case of government stock converted into other government stock).
29. Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258 (N. Y. 1823); cf. Oakes v. Oakes, 9
Hare 666, 68 Eng. Rep. R. 68o (Ch. 1852).
30. [19o6] 2 Ch. 480, 95 L. T. R. (N. s.) 350.
31. Wiggins v. Cheatham, 143 Tenn. 4o6, 225 S. W. 1040 (1920). See also Elwyn
v. De Garmendia, 148 Md. iO9, 128 Atl. 913 (925), where a double pearl necklace con-

sisted of one string within the other and one was given to A, the other to B. The combination of the two into one so that the originals were indistinguishable and their identity destroyed, did not work an ademption.
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adeemed, where such annuities were first reduced in income and subsequently called in and new ones substituted.32 It is necessary here to
consider the legacy from the standpoint of economic interest rather
than from that of testamentary formula. Furthermore, there is no
conflict over the proposition that a mere renewal of an obligation that
83
has been bequeathed does not adeem it.
Merger, Consolidation, Reorganization and Sale of Assets: If the
term merger is strictly used, then the merged corporation ceases to exist
and the stock bequeathed is the obligation of a totally different obligor.
Is this a mere change of form? With perhaps some exceptions 34 the
authorities usually hold that legacies of stock in a corporation which
later becomes merged are not adeemed by the merger.3 5
Consolidationmeans that two or more corporations have become
amalgamated and have formed a new one. The term is loosely used
sometimes as applicable to any or all mutations which may occur.
Generally a consolidation does not, of itself, cause an ademption. In
Goode v. Reynolds 3 6 the testator bequeathed to A four of his eighteen
shares in the Farmers' Bank. Before his death the Farmers' Bank
consolidated with another bank and the consolidation assumed the
name Farmers' Deposit Bank, the shareholders of the Farmers' Bank
32. Sheffield v. Coventry, 2 Russ. & M. 317, 39 Eng. Rep. R. 415 (1833) ; Blair v.
Scribner, 65 N. J. Eq. 498, 57 Atl. 318 (1904), where the bonds bequeathed were surrendered and others of the same company substituted.
33. Connecticut Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 55 Atl. i71
(i9o3) ; Ford v. Ford, 23 N. H. 212 (1851) (new notes taken and one signer released) ;
Anthony v. Smith, 45 N. C. 188 (1853) (renewal of bond by same debtor) ; cf. Dingwell v. Askew, I Cox 427, 29 Eng. Rep. R. 1233 (Ch. 1788). See Smith, Ademption by
Exthnctot= (193) 6 Wis. L. REV. 229, 234; (1926) 1I Com. L. Q. 271. If the subject matter of a specific legacy is sold and subsequently other shares of the same description are purchased, the legacy is held to be adeemed in spite of the fact that the
vill is to be construed as if written just at the time of death. Such a repurchase is not
a substitution. In re Gibson, L. R. 2 Eq. 669 (I866).
34. Kepple's Estate, xg Pa. Dist. 627 (igio).
35. Goode v. Reynolds, 2o8 Ky. 441, 271 S. W. 6oo (925) ; Gardner v. Gardner,
72 N. H. 257, 56 Ati. 316 (903); Matter of Spears, 151 Misc. I8r, 27i N. Y. Supp.
!Io (Surr. Ct. 1934) ; In re Jameson [i9o8] 2 Ch. iI1, 98 L. T. R. (N. s.) 745. (This

is really a case, however, of misdescription. The testatrix had originally owned stock
in Corporation A but it had merged with B and she had accepted B stock.)
36. 208 Ky. 441, 271 S. W. 6oo (1925). Other such cases are: Wood's Estate, 267
Pa. 462, iio Atl. 90 (I92o); In re Pierce, 25 R. I. 34, 54 Atl. 588 (903) (four corporations consolidated) ; Oakes v. Oakes, 9 Hare 666, 68 Eng. Rep. R. 68o (Ch. 1852)
(This may be a species of consolidation. The change was authorized by a special statute which is a. common English way of handling the situation) ; Re Humphreys, 6o
SOL. J. IO5 (Ch. I9,5) ("All my shares in A Co." passes the shares held by testator in
B Co. due to a reconstruction of A). Contra: Horn's Estate, 317 Pa. 49, i75 Atl. 414
(1934) ; Re Atlay, 56 SOL. J. 444 (Ch. i912). In Horn's Estate, the testator made a
specific legacy of stock in Co. A, which consolidated with B to form C and testator
received stock in C, both common and preferred, in exchange. Later there was a 2/
split-up of the C stock and a declaration of 25% stock dividend. The legacy was held
to be adeemed. This case follows the testamentary rule rather than that of economic
equivalent. In the case of Re Atlay, sitpra, the testator made a specific bequest of stock
in the W Co. at the time she owned stock in the A Co. At the time of her death, A
and W had consolidated, forming a new company, B. The court held that the bequest
failed. Quaere, however, why the bequest in the V Co. could not be regarded as a
misdescription for "B Co.".
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receiving an equal number of the shares in the Farmers' Deposit Bank.
They also received a large liquidating dividend. Later the Farmers'
Deposit Bank combined with the Phoenix National Bank and the testator received four shares in it. Testator also bequeathed to A his stock
in N bank, which thereafter consolidated with P bank, the testator
receiving the same number of shares in the consolidated bank as he had
old shares, plus a liquidating stock dividend in a third corporation. In
holding, as to both legacies, that the new stock, as well as the stock
dividend, passed to A, the court cited cases of split-ups, consolidations,
reorganizations and obligations with change of obligor, which had held
that there was no ademption. Mr. Justice Dietzman observed that
one theory of ademption depends upon intent, and that even if the intent theory were not adopted, there was here no more than a formal
change. This sums up however to the proposition that the legatee is to
be placed in the equivalent economic position he would have enjoyed if
there had been no change. The effect of this is that the exact language
of the will is abandoned.
A reorganizationof a prosperous as well as of a failing company
may occur. It may amount to an alteration in the capital structure
without change of name, or it may consist of a change of name and
but little more. 37 Again, there may be a winding up of a failing corporation and a sale of its assets to a new or to a reorganized company.
Thus, a reorganization may become so complete a transformation of the
original as to make its shares of stock entirely different, as to the risk
involved, as to personnel, or even as to its scope of activity, so that
there may be little left of the original substance. A consolidation of
several corporations thins down the original interest of a shareholder
in one of them proportionate to the number and size of corporations
involved and the amount of capital brought in. Further, additional
ventures and hazards are introduced. Accordingly, the consolidated
entity may easily involve little more than a memory of the old corporation. Yet even here the view is often taken that specific legacies of the
original stock are not adeemed. In the case of Pope v. Hinckley,88 for
example, the corporation went into the hands of a receiver. The assets
were sold to a foreign corporation and the testator received a voting
certificate from the reorganizers to be subsequently exchanged for new
37. See It re Clifford [1912] I Ch. 29, iO6 L. T. R. (N. s.) 14 (mere change of
name accompanied by 4 to I split-up); In re Leeming [1912] I Ch. 828, io6 L. T. R.
(N. s.) 993 (change of name, and testator exchanged ten £5 shares preferred for 2o
preferred and 20 common, each 15).
38. 209 Mass. 323, 95 N. E. 798 (1911).
See Gorham v. Chadwick, 135 Me. 479,
20o Atl. 500 (1938), where the testator's will bequeathed common stock in corporation

X to A. The company became insolvent and testator became liable on calls. To satisfy
the liability, testator subscribed to new second preferred stock. And it was held that
this passed under the specific bequest.
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stock. The voting certificate passed in lieu of the stock. The same
result was reached in Pitkingtoi'sTrust,39 where the bonds of an embarrassed corporation having been bequeathed were surrendered for
stock in the new one. On the other hand in Bradley's Estate,40 Re
Leeming,4' and Re Kuypers,4 2 it may fairly be said that the reorganized
corporation was essentially similar to the old one, and for that reason
there was no ademption.
The matter of sale of corporate assets normally involves the surrender of the charter of the seller and the liquidation and distribution
of its assets to.its shareholders. In such a case ademption of the bequeathed shares of its stock seems inevitable. If, however, the sale of
assets is in pursuance of a reorganization scheme, the corporation having gone upon the financial rocks, it is merely another situation like the
one outlined above. 43 Some authority however has been found to the
no difference whether
effect that there is an ademption and that it makes
44
testator receives cash, or a bond, or new stock.
From the standpoint of the testamentary law the most astonishing
thing about these cases is the violation of supposed ademption rules
in the matter of conversion and substitution. The exchange of bonds
for stock and stock for bonds has not infrequently been held to be
without effect on the will. Courts, considering the question as one of
corporation law, often hold that intent is of paramount importance
though the testamentary rule is that intent does not control. Although
the matter often is not one of voluntary or involuntary change of form,
there is enough left of the testamentary rule to produce in many cases
confused and irrational results. Perhaps equally strange are the consequences arising in cases of consolidation. There can scarcely be said
to be a mere formal change in stock where a small corporation merges
with a larger one, especially since the personnel is much changed and
perhaps there is also an alteration in the nature of the business, a change
of location, an increase in hazards, and a change in the business outlook.
The same is true in reorganization cases, and yet in nearly all such
39. 13 L. T. R. (N. s.) 35 (Ch. 1865).
40. 119 Misc. 2, 194 N. Y. Supp. 888 (Surr. Ct. 1922) (corporation reorganized
only because some shareholders refused to consent to renewal of the charter, which had
expired). See also Johns Hopkins University v. Uhrig, 145 Md. 114, 125 Atl. 6o6
(1924), where the nature of reorganization was not shown, but it apparently involved
considerable alteration of capital structure.
41. [1912] 1 Ch. 828, lo6 L. T. R. (N. s.) 793 (reorganized company with change
of name, essentially same as the one liquidated, though the capital structure was
changed).
42. [19251 Ch. 244, 133 L. T. R. (N. s.) 468. The capital changes might have been
made without a reorganization and change of name.
43. Pope v. Hinckley, 209 Mass. 323, 95 N. E. 798 (1911).
But cf. Buder v. Stocke, 343 Mo.
44. Kepple's Estate, 19 Pa. Dist. 627 (gio).
506, 121 S. W. (2d) 852 (1938).

682

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

instances there is no ademption.4 5 Thus the test whether the change is
formal or substantial does not work. The problem whether trustees
may retain securities received as a result of corporate transformations
40
like those described above is somewhat analogous.

II. THE BENEFICIARY CORPORATION IS MERGED
So much for the effect of mergers, consolidations, reorganizations
and mutations of capital structure upon the ademption of legacies of
shares of stock in a corporation.
What effect do similar changes have when the beneficiary is transformed? In Wright v. Wright 41 the testator gave one-third of his
45. It is interesting to note how completely overlooked is this matter of ademption
by writers on corporations. Thus, there is no such topic in FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS
(1931).
In 6 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. I927); §4321, the short section on
ademption deals with the ordinary cases of extinction and there is no discussion at all
of the mutations of stocks through corporate modifications. See also 2 CLARK & MARSHALL, CORPORATIONS (1901) 1613; 2 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) §§299-307.
The discussion of the matter in treatises on wills is fragmentary. See 2 JARMAN,
WILLS (7th ed. 193o) 1O38-1o44; 2 PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) §§ 1333-1335; 2 WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS (I2th ed. 193o) 862-3; 3 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) 1524-5.

46. In an early New York case, Hogan v. De Peyster, 2o Barb. IOO (N. Y. 1855),
a corporation was chartered by the United States and the charter expired. The shareholders received stock in the United States bank chartered by Pennsylvania (a bank
organized to take over the assets of the former). It was held that a trustee was not
liable to a penalty for holding the new stock, though the new corporation later failed.
But it has also been held in New York that stocks of subsidiary corporations received
by the trustee as liquidating dividends could not be continued in his portfolio. In re
Franklyn Trust Co., 84 Misc. 686, 147 N. Y. Supp. 885 (Surr. Ct. 1914).

The English court has, on at least one occasion, held that stock in a reorganized
company could be held under the terms of the trust permitting the retention "in the
present form of investment". The court said that there was no difference in the business. "Of course shares in the new company are not shares in the old. . . . I ought
to look at the substance of the transaction." Smith v. Lewis [1902] 2 Ch. 667, 671.
This case conflicts with Bucknill v. Morris, 54 L. J. (N. S.) 388 (Ch. 1885) and was
criticized in Lovelace v. Anson [1907]

2

Ch. 424, where trustees held stock in a hold-

ing company which held the stock of two railways. This stock was cancelled, and it
was said that the trustees could not retain the new stock in the two railways issued in
lieu of the old stock. In accord with Smith v. Lewds, supra, Anderson v. Bean, 272

Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647 (193o) ; Macfarlane's Estate, 317 Pa. 377, 177 Atl. 12 (1935).
In the latter case, the trustee joined in a reorganization plan and received in return
for the old common stock, new stock partly common and partly preferred. It was held

that he might hold the new stock, it being substantially equivalent to the old. In the
Anderson case, the assets of a Maine corporation were transferred to a Massachusetts
corporation of the same name, and stock in the latter was issued to the trustee in lieu

of stock in the former corporation. It was held that he may continue to hold them.
See 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 231.4. Not so where the reorganization involves the
exchange for securities of inferior quality and value, as in Scott's Trust, 322 Pa. I, 184

Atl. 245 (1936). Where trustees are permitted to keep the new stock, it is generally
on the ground of an emergency which equity will surmount. In re New [19O1] 2 Ch.
534 (trustees permitted to assent to the reorganization of a prosperous company and

hold the new stock) ; see In re Tollemache [1903] I Ch. 457, 461, appeal dismissed, id.
at 955. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N. E. 530 (1927), Where

the terms of the will were broad enough to permit the purchase or retention of the new

shares. See 2 ScOr, TRUSTS (1939) § 167.
47. 225 N. Y. 329, 122 N. E. 213 (1919).
See also Gladding v. St. Matthew's
Church, 25 R. 1. 628, 57 Atl. 86o (9o4).
The testator gave the principal over after

the death of his son A to St. Ann's Church for the benefit of deaf mutes of New York
City. There was at the time a church corporation named Rector, Church Wardens and
Vestrymen of St. Ann's Church for Deaf Mutes of New York City. This church sold
its buildings and was torn down and later consolidated (merged) with another having
a similar name and the same objects. The court held that the legacy lapsed.
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residuary estate to trustees in trust to pay the income to his sister for
ler life and after her death to pay out of the principal, the sum of
$Ioo,ooo to the Washington Heights Library in New York City. Before his death a statute was passed enabling all library corporations in
New York City to consolidate. The statute provided that on consolidation, "all manner of rights and privileges and every species of property theretofore belonging to the separate companies should be deemed
to be transferred to and vested in the new corporation". After the
testator's death another statute was passed providing that when any
library had transferred all its property to the New York Public Library
(on conditions agreed upon) a surrender of the charter might be accepted (by the regents of New York University) and any devise or bequest contained in any last will which had been made to any corporation
so conveying its property should not fail, but should inure to the benefit
of the New York Public Library. Thereupon the Washington Heights
Library, before the death of the life tenant, surrendered its charter,
having conveyed its property to the New York Public Library under an
appropriate agreement for maintenance of the library at its location.
On the death of the life tenant, the New York Public Library claimed
the benefit of the legacy to the Washington Heights Library. It was
held (a) that no interest in the legacy vested prior to the death of the
life tenant; (b) that the beneficiary having surrendered its charter,
ceased to exist; and (c) the statute enacted in order to save the benefit
to the claimant did not have that effect inasmuch as the legacy had
already lapsed and was intestate property.
It follows from this holding that where a beneficiary corporation
merges into or consolidates with another or others it ceases to exist
and its successor does not take. Actually involved here is either a merger or a transfer of assets amounting to a sale, which has been held
48
to be a mere merger.
It has been shown above that a merger generally does not cause
the ademption of a bequest of the stock of the merged corporation. 49
There is a close analogy between the ademption and the lapse of legacies. In the one case the property no longer exists in the estate and in
the other the beneficiary has ceased to exist. The issue of existence is
the same and the same principles would seem to control.
The court relied upon In re Bergdorf's Will 50 as a precedent, in
which the appointment of an executor and trustee of a merged bank was
48. Cf. Collinsville Nat. Bank v. Esau, 74 Okla. 45, 176 Pac. 514 (1918).
49. See cases in note 35 supra. The same is generally true of a consolidation, see

cases in note 36 supra; and of a reorganization, see notes 38 to
50. 2o6 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E. 714 (1912).

42

supra.
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held to pass to the surviving corporation. This was explained, however, as occurring by act of the legislature rather than by the fact of
continuing identity. It was intimated that the appointment would have
failed but for the statute. But the statute so relied on provided merely
that all rights, franchises and interests of the merged corporation should
pass to the continuing corporation. And it is commonly thought that
if a statute is required to provide for the succession, such a provision is
not broad enough to apply to fiduciary duties which are not assignable
unless expressly made so by statute.
There are some cases reasonably parallel to Wright v. Wright
which reach the contrary result. In McCully's Estate 51 there was a
gift to Grace Presbyterian Church. This organization consolidated with
another of the same denomination to form the Waverly Presbyterian
Church. The testator, formerly a member of the original group, executed his will while still a member, and on the accomplishment of the
consolidation, took membership in the new organization, but never
changed his will. It was held that the Waverly Presbyterian Church
took the legacy. And the right of succession was not grounded on a
statute. Likewise, in In re Scriinger'sEstate,52 where a legacy had been
left to the trustees of the old corporation, the new one was allowed to
take. The beneficiary was a Roman Catholic Orphans Association,
whose charter had expired prior to the execution of the will. After that
a new association, having almost the same name and exactly the same
purposes, was chartered. There were three grounds assigned for this
result: (i) the beneficiaries are identical; (2) the corporation is the
same; and (3) the cy pres doctrine may be applied. In support of the
second position, the court quoted from an earlier case to the effect that
where there is a reorganization under a new name but the shareholders
are practically the same, the directors identical, and the business the
same, "a court of equity will regard the new corporation as a continuation of the old". 3 This case might also be regarded as one of a merger,
since if the new corporation received the property of the old one, it
would undoubtedly be liable for the former's obligations. 54
51. 269 Pa. 122, 112 Atl. 159 (1920).
See also Hosea v. Jacobs, 98 Mass. 65
(1867). There the testator gave a legacy to a church organization of which he was a
member. Before his death it changed its name and place of worship and formed a new
corporation. A codicil executed after this change expressly confirmed the will. In
holding that the legacy did not lapse, the court said it was composed of the same membership, worshipped in the same manner and under the same discipline and used the
same records. The fact of republication seems to be without significance. Cf. Coldwell
v. Holme, 2 Sm. & G. 31, 65 Eng. Rep. R. 288 (V. C. 1854), where the gift went to the
new society on the theory that it was merely misdescribed in the will. See also Evans,
Irregularitiesof Testamentary Expression (1939) 27 KY. L. J. 241, 247.
52. 188 Cal. 158, 206 Pac. 67 (1922).
53. Stanford Hotel Co. v. Schwind Co., i8o Cal. 348, 354, 181 Pac. 780, 783 (1919).
54. Collinsville Nat. Bank v. Esau, 74 Okla. 45, 176 Pac. 5
(1918).
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So in Wright v. Wright 55 the patrons of the library, the property
devoted to its purposes, the location and all the surroundings of the new
corporation are identical with those of the old, and if the testator were
living he would have the same interest in the new organization as in the
old. A court of equity might well have found such continuity of existence of the named beneficiary sufficient to warrant reaching a different
conclusion from the one declared. The analogy of legacies of stock in
corporations which subsequently undergo transformations points in the
same direction. It seems probable that only charitable corporations will
be involved in this type of situation. The Pennsylvania and California
cases reach a sounder result, the existence of the trust in the California
case not being regarded as a material factor. In the final analysis the
evident intent of the testator should not be frustrated. In the Wright
case no consideration was taken of the possible application of cy pres,
and undue emphasis was placed upon the surrender of the charter.

III. TiE MERGER OF A CORPORATE FIDUCIARY
The question whether a corporation which has been named executor-trustee and which thereafter undergoes various possible transformations, may qualify or if it has already qualified, may continue so to
act, or may file the final account of the one originally named, has met
with diametrically opposed answers. The degree, quality or number
of transformations has played but little part in the matter.
In Chicago Title Co. v. Zinzer,5 6 Trust Co. A, which had been
appointed executor-trustee to sell land merged with Trust Co. B,
the latter continuing the business of the former. By statute in Illinois
such a merger is permitted but is expressly declared to be a consolidation rather than a merger. B contracted to sell defendant the land in
question which constituted a part of the estate which was under settlement. In an action by the trustee for specific performance, it was held
that B succeeded to A's appointment and could pass a good title. It
was declared that the rule forbidding the delegation of fiduciary duties
was not applicable to a corporation because the testator must know that
management is subject to change. In re Bergdorfs Will 57 also decides
55. 225 N. Y. 329, 122 N. E. 213 (1919).
56. 264 Ill. 3, lo5 N. E. 718 (1914). Cf. First Minn. Trust Co. v. Lancaster
Corp., 185 Minn. 12i, 24o N. W. 459 (1931) involving a transfer of land to a trust
company in trust. It merged with another company and later consolidated with still
another to form the plaintiff. The plaintiff was allowed to sue on a lease made by the
original trustee. The statute authorizing consolidation does not violate the constitution
respecting the appointment of trustees by the courts. The matter of succession to the
appointment does not depend upon a specific statute. See I5 FLErCrER, Cyc. Cons.
(Repl. Vol. 1938) § 7094; Bisbee, Conolidation and Merger (1929) 6 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 404, 421; Fruchtman, The Effect of Merger or Consolidation on the Succession of
CorporateFiduciaries (1934) 22 Ky. L. J. 378; Note (1930) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 126.
57. 2o6 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E. 714 (1912) ; accord, In re Barreiro's Estate, 125 Cal.
App. 153, 13 P. (2d) IO7 (1932); In re Barnett's Estate, 97 Cal. App. 138, 275 Pac.

686

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

that in New York the appointment as fiduciary of a corporation that
merges into another passes to the continuing company. The court gave
two reasons for this holding: (a) Corporations are allowed to merge
and to consolidate. The testator, knowing this fact, must be taken
to have consented in advance to the delegation of the fiduciary duties
and to have intended that such a succession should take place. This
was the ground of the holding in Illinois. (b) The second reason is
based upon the statute which provides that "all manner of rights and
privileges and every species of property theretofore belonging to the
separate companies shall be deemed transferred to and vested in the
new corporation". The second reason is inconsistent with the first because the court expressly declared that the intent of.the testator is without importance since it is enforcing the intent of the legislature. Further, as above observed, the language of the statute seems hardly broad
enough to direct the succession of fiduciary duties to a new and different
fiduciary if a statute is necessary. If the first ground stands, and it is"
more plausible than the second, a statute expressly transferring the
appointment to the successor is probably unnecessary. Recently in
Kentucky it has been held that where a state corporate trustee had been
changed into a national bank the successor could exercise the appointment as executor. The case purports to find authority therefor in the
statutes which authorize banks to do a trust business and those other
statutes which authorize merger and consolidation and transmutation
from state to national banks. No express authority, however, for the
succession to fiduciary duties can be found in these statutes. 58 The
court might well have placed its decision on the continued identity of the
executor.5 9 In Massachusetts, if there is a merger, the surviving bank
appointed a fiduciary before the merger may continue thereafter, even
though there was a change of name, since it operates under its former
charter. The corporate identity continues, despite the fact that there
may well be a material increase in the hazards of business arising from
the merger. 0
453 (929) ; Mueller v. First National Bank, i7i Ga. 845, 156 S. E. 662 (I93i) (bank
A appointee became bank C before testator's death). Bantetes Estate involved a very

extended transformation. The nominee A sold out to B, who sold out to C, a state
bank. C was transformed into national bank D. It was held that, under the statute,
the successor could render the final account of the trustee. This is a case of continuing
rather than of originally qualifying under the will.

58. Alt v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co., 26o Ky. 87, 83 S. W. (2d) 866

('935). See also Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) § 588, authorizing reorganizations;
and id. § 883c-i, authorizing banks to become fiduciaries and to change to national
banks. See also Adams v. Atlantic Nat. Bank, 15 Fla. 399, 155 So. 648 (1934).

59. See cases cited note 21 supra.
6o. See Worcester Co. National Bank, Petitioner, 263 Mass. 394, 399, 16i N. E.
797, 798 (1928), where a state bank consolidated with a national bank and the consolidated bank continued doing business under the charter of the national bank, though
there was a change of name. This amounts to a merger. On the other hand, where
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In case of change into a national bank, however, it is held that
the successor cannot exercise the powers granted under the appointment. Thus, in Petition of Commonwealth-Atlantic National Bank,61
state bank A, having been appointed a fiduciary, was converted into national bank B during the lifetime of the testator and later merged with
national bank C. It was held that bank C could not perform the duties
arising under the appointment made to A. The observations were made
that such an appointment is neither property nor an asset; that in the
case of the appointment of a corporation there is some degree of trust
and confidence implied, though it be subject to very great possible
changes of management, hazards, etc.; that the distinctions between a
state bank and national bank are fundamental, since the banks are controlled by different sets of laws, and since the state charter has to be
surrendered. It was admitted, however, that the new corporation is
identical for most purposes with the old one and that most of the powers of the merged corporation pass without express provision therefor. 62
Moreover, the argument that the change of a state bank into a national
bank is significant because of the difference in the control regulations
and surrender of the old charter is alone clearly insufficient to create
a change of identity. The unquestioned substantial continuance of the
entity of a state bank when changed to a national bank seems to make
inconsequential the contention in the Massachusetts cases that the
change arising from the application of national laws and supervision,
instead of state laws and supervision, makes the succession to the appointment impossible. 63 It must, therefore, be the consolidation thereafter which changed the identity, but even here the court says there is
an identity for most purposes. Since a testator knows of the possibility
or even probability of such a change, why may he not be said to have
consented that the changed entity shall perform the appointment? The
property of the old bank continues in the new one and doubtless most
of the powers under the present charter were found in the old one;
likewise, the corporate purposes are the same. In fact, the transformation is less great than would arise in case three corporations should
merge into a fourth which formally continues with its name and charthis same merged state bank had been appointed a fiduciary, the appointment was held
not to pass to the consolidated bank. Worcester Co. Nat. Bank, Petitioner, 263 Mass.
444, i62 N. E. 217 (1928).
6r.

249

Mass. 44o, i44 N. E. 443 (924).

62. E. g., a lease held by the merged corporation determinable at such time as the
corporation shall cease to exist, is not terminated by a consolidation where the lessee
disappears and the continuing company is chartered under the laws of a different state.
The lessor knew he was dealing with a corporation which was subject to change. Proprietors of Locks & Canals v. Boston & Maine R. RX, 245 Mass. 52, 139 N. E. 839 (I923).
63. But cf. Atlantic Nat Bank, Petitioner, 26r Mass. 217, I58 N. E. 78o (927);
accord, Stevens v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 173 Ga. 332, i6o S. E. 243 (ig3i).
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ter. Thus, overemphasis is laid upon the purely formal continuance of
the corporation which retains its charter, and perhaps its name, and
too little significance is attached to the factual continuance of the
merged company.64
Where the new corporation succeeds to the appointment it may do
so (a) because the identity of the merged corporation may be found
to continue as the functional equivalent, or (b) because a statute may
create the right of succession. Such a statute must be one which expressly transfers fiduciary appointments to the successor, and there are
not many states which make express statutory provisions for this
matter.6 5
There are certain situations which, while formally somewhat analogous, are in no way controlling. Thus, (a) the question arises whether
the transformed corporation may sue on claims due the original corporation; (b) one of the transformed corporations may have been
granted certain tax exemptions; (c) the matter of paying a new organization fee to the state on the ground that a new entity has been
created appears; and finally (d) the issue comes up whether certain
powers granted in the original corporate charter may be exercised by
the new corporation.
(a) In actions on claims due the predecessor authority in the successor to sue is assumed. This may be due in part to some statute and
especially to the agreement of the original constituent corporations
66
where the rights claimed were assignable.
(b) As to whether the tax exemptions of the old corporation exist
in favor of the new, it may be surmised that the statute under which the
privilege is claimed would always be strictly construed. It has been
held that the adoption of a new name, the calling in of the certificates
64. It has occasionally been suggested that both corporations in a merger or consolidation continue their existence. See Bishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 289, 299 (I859).
In Commonwealth v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 3o3 Pa. 241, 154 Atl. 379 (93)
a state trust company joined with a national bank to form a national bank and trust
company, using the charter of the national bank but with change of name. The consolidation did not extinguish the state corporation. Also where a domestic and a foreign corporation consolidate, it is commonly said that both continue to exist. See Ohio
& M. Ry. v. People, 123 Ill. 467, 483, 14 N. E. 874, 88o (1888) ; Vaughan v. Nashville
C. & St. Louis Ry., 192 Ky. 137, 144, 232 S. W. 411, 415 (1921).
65. See statutes cited in 3 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 531, nn. 15, 24.
For decisions under such statutes, see Estate of Barreiro, 125 Cal. App. 153, 13 P.
(2d) 1017 (1932); In re Barnett's Estate, 97 Cal. App. 138, 275 Pac. 453 (1929);
Mercantile Trust Co. v. San Joaquin Agr. Corp., 89 Cal. App. 558, 265 Pac. 583 (1928).
66. Michigan Ins. Co. v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293 (1892) (where a state bank was

converted into a national bank, the latter was allowed to sue on an obligation due the
state bank) ; Green Co. v. Conness, 1O9 U. S. 104 (1883) (Bond issued by a county in
payment of subscription for the construction of a railway; payee merged; held, that the
successor may sue, because all franchises and privileges are merged) ; Barrett v. Stoddard Co., 183 S. W. 644 (Mo. App. 1916) (same result where there is a consolidation).
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for cancellation and the issuance of new certificates, and a subsequent
filing of the articles with the Secretary of State, indicate that there was
a complete destruction of the corporation, which fact destroys the tax
exemption. 67 In the case of a merger, however, where the survivor had
the tax immunity, the property acquired by the merger did not thereafter enjoy it, though the property and franchises of the survivor were
unaffected by the merger. 68
(c) Most of the cases hold that from the standpoint of paying
incorporation fees, the resultant corporation is a new one and must pay
them.6 9 This is a matter of course result.
(d) Whether the express powers found in the original charter or
charters of the constituents continue under the new organization depends upon the wording of the statute under which the transformation
takes place and perhaps somewhat upon the agreement made between
these original corporations." The power of delegation of fiduciary
duties is not generally included among the express powers. So where a
bank having, as trustee, the power to sell land on default of the debtor,
merged with another, it was held that the successor had the same
power.7 1 The rule against the power to delegate duties was declared
inapplicable to corporations because when a corporation is selected as
trustee the settlor knows that the management must in time change,
and the choice does not depend upon personal confidence. He also
67. Keokuk & Western R. R. v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 301 (1894). See also St.
Louis & Southern Ry. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465 (1885). Cf. Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S.
319 (1877) ; People v. Rice, 57 Hun. 547, II N. Y. Supp. 249 (3d Dep't 1890); 15
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68. Tomlinson v. Branch, 82 U. S. 46o (1872). See also R. R. v. Georgia, 98 U. S.
359 (1878) ; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 718 (1876) ; Central R. R.
and Banking Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665 (1875) ; Philadelphia and Wilmington R. .
v. Maryland, 51 U. S. 376 (185o).
69. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Doyle, 259 Ill. 489, io2 N. E. 79o (1913) (this
was, in fact, a merger, but is called a consolidation by the court, because the statute did
not authorize a merger); Scheidel Coil Co. v. Rose, 242 Ill. 484, 9o N. E. 221 (Igo9).
In Clearwater v. Meredith, i Wall. 25 (U. S. 1864), the defendant had guaranteed that
the stock of corporation A would be worth a named amount at a given date. On that
date A had consolidated with B, forming corporation C. Defendant was not liable as a
guarantor of the C stock.
70. . R. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359 (1878). In Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co.
v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 214 Ala. 486, io8 So. 353 (1926) the merged corporation had power to mortgage its mineral rights. Since the statute gives to the successor
all the rights, privileges, powers, and franchises of the predecessor, the former had the
power to mortgage the mineral rights. The same result was reached in Cooper v. Corbin, 105 Ill. 224 (882) (power to mortgage) and for the same reason in Chicago, R. L
& P. R. R. v. Moffitt, 75 Ill. 524 (1874), the new corporation was liable for a prior
tort. See Ohio & M. Ry. v. People ex tel. Hanna, 123 Ill. 467, 14 N. E. 874 (1888).
Cf. Guardian Trust & Exrs. Co. v. Smith (1923) N. Z. L. R. 1284. If the appointment
or function claimed is not delegable, it is difficult to see how an agreement thereto by
the corporations concerned can make it so.
71. First Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 16o Tenn. 72, 22 S. W. (2d) 245 (929) (intervivos transaction). The court cites the McFadden Act, 44 STAT. 1224 (927) ; 12 U. S.
C. A. § 34a (1934), but also cites cases reaching a similar result which do not depend
upon this Act.
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knows that the corporation may be absorbed into another. So in California, the trustee corporation, X, had been the grantee in a mortgage
to secure an obligation. X consolidated with Y and became Z. On
default Z successfully sued to foreclose the mortgage. 72 In Maryland,
however, the power of the constituent to execute certain bonds was
denied to the successor because it was held that the terms of the consolidation and statute did not confer all the powers held by the constituents to the new corporation.

73

To conclude. As to the three issues: will a bequest of stock in
corporation A pass to the legatee as stock in corporation B; will legacies to corporation A pass to corporation B; and will the appointment
of A as fiduciary inure to the benefit of B-all depend for their solution upon the degree of corporate continuity and thus upon the existence
of an equivalent where no statute affects the matter. The law of accession may offer an analogy. The former test whether title passed or not
was the continued identity of the subject matter, especially in the Roman
Law. The new test is that of comparative value.
It is evident that no hard and fast rule should be laid down. A
rigid formal rule which requires the corporation to be identical in all
essentials with its former self or to retain its charter in order to prevent a failure, or lapse of the legacy or of the appointment, is undesirable. In a busy world not all possible contingencies can be foreseen and
provided for. The above discussion seems to show: that the rule of
economic equivalent is supplanting the rule requiring substantial identity in the case of ademptions; that the authorities are divided on both
the issues of the lapsing of legacies and the matter of transmitting appointments. In all those cases where a lapse has been declared it seems
probable that the testator's intention was thwarted. It is believed that
the cases sustaining the gift for the benefit of charity produce more
desirable consequences and that there is a "purpose equivalent" in the
new corporation. With respect to the matter of transmitting appointments, strictly speaking when a testator appoints A he does not intend
to appoint B. But it does not follow that if A becomes B or both A and
B become C, he affirmatively does not wish B or C, as the case may be,
to act. There are certain considerations which should not be overlooked, such as the fact that the new corporation has much the same
72. Mercantile Trust Co. v. San Joaquin Agr. Corp., 89 Cal. App. 558, 265 Pac.
583 (1928) (inter-vivos). The California statute was interpreted as having the effect
of awarding this power to the plaintiff. See also Iowa Light, Heat & Power Co. v.
First National Bank, 250 Mass. 353, 145 N. E. 433 (1924) (the trustee succeeds to all
the rights, title, and powers of the original trustee, changed by consolidation) ; First
Nat. Bank v. Chapman, io6 Tex. 322, 164 S. W. 90 (1914).
73. Diggs v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 112 Md. 5o, 75 At. 517 (i9io) (old companies were dissolved and plaintiff is a new one).
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personnel, that it continues the business, that it possesses the old assets,
and has much the same powers. These matters are as significant as are
the formal change of name, the enlargement of the business and surrender of charter (which may or may not have occurred).74 Here it
may be said that there is a functional eqiivalent. At least the corporation in its transformed state is more nearly the fiduciary chosen by the
testator than any other one.
74. See James Truslow Adams, Corporate Trwits and Mergers (193i) 16 MAss.

L. Q. 28.

